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The problem of whether “Chinese philosophy” exists and deserves a place in Philos-
ophy departments has not only remained unsolved but has even hardly led to any 
meaningful debate. The fact that repeated appeals to universality and fairness have 
largely remained unanswered indicates the limits of rationality in this matter. I have 
argued in the past that the futility of rational arguments is related to our emotional 
attachment to entities that fall beyond our control, such as the institutions where we 
are trained, and that, like a family, shape our views on a subconscious level.1 This 
essay is not yet another argument in favor of Chinese philosophy, but turns to the 
institutional level, more specifically the European universities. More than anywhere 
else in the world, they perpetuate an implicit bias against anything non-Western. 
Recent initiatives to include some non-Western content in the curricula are often 
well meant ad hoc corrections that actually allow the dominant framework to persist. 
In order to make this more general point, my focus here will be on the issue of 
 “Chinese philosophy.”
The question of whether or not early Chinese thought should be taught in Phi-
losophy departments is, in at least three senses, a matter of “place,” the topic of 
the Eleventh East-West Philosophers’ Conference in Hawai‘i in May 2016. The most 
obvious place involved in the controversy is, of course, China as a controversial 
 object of teaching in Western Philosophy departments: was China ever, like Europe, 
a cradle of philosophy? Place is, second, also involved in the locations that do or 
do not include Chinese thought in their philosophy departments. The “legitimacy 
of Chinese philosophy” (Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing 中國哲學合法性) controversy 
that peaked around the turn of this century has clearly shown the crucial relevance 
of place in this second sense: while most Western Philosophy departments exclude 
Chinese thought, the Chinese almost unanimously include it.2 In the West, the re-
cent state-of-the-art concerning this issue has, moreover, focused on the situation 
in the United States, leaving Europe out of the picture, except as the culprit for 
 Western ethno centrism.3 A third sense in which place matters is the academic disci-
pline or department where early Chinese thought is taught: while this often happens 
in other than Philosophy departments — such as Asian Studies, Sinology, Language, 
History, or Religion4 — the reflection on its status does not seem to fall under any of 
them. 
This very reflection is nevertheless the ambition of the present essay by elaborat-
ing on the three types of place, or rather non-place, “u-topia”: China as a contested 
cradle of philosophy, Europe as an overlooked academic space, and a non-existing 
department from where to tackle the question. In the two first senses — China as 
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the non-object of study in Philosophy departments, and Europe as an academic 
non-location — this essay consists of, respectively, a continuation of my earlier reflec-
tions5 and a supply of novel information with a focus on institutional matters. The 
disciplinary non-place is more tricky: many scholars of Chinese thought are not 
 particularly well equipped to discuss seriously the (non)location of China at their 
home institutions; and potentially better equipped scholars of Sociology, Education, 
or Psychology have thus far not shown any interest in what for them is probably a 
non-issue. These three types of “non-place” thus form the crossroads where I resume 
the analysis of the issue of the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy. They come together 
at an academic core around which we keep circling.
I. The Meeting Point of Three Non-places
A simple question such as “Should Chinese philosophy (or thought, texts, etc.) be 
studied and taught (and hence, financed) at Philosophy departments” is a matter of 
three places: (pre-modern) China as the origin of the texts, Europe as the place where 
they should (not) be studied, and finally the university departments or disciplines that 
are involved.
China as Object of Study
As for the object of inquiry — Chinese thought in Philosophy departments — the de-
bate has been notoriously inconclusive, with arguments on both sides lacking the 
persuasive force to convince opponents.6 To begin with, the unsettled definition of 
philosophy has rendered opposite arguments equally defensible: the view that Chi-
nese philosophy has never existed (and hence deserves no place at Western philoso-
phy departments) because philosophy has always been Western7 versus the claim 
that Chinese thought is profoundly philosophical — not merely philosophically inter-
esting in the way that religion, art, and literature can be.8 Most arguments in favor of 
Chinese philosophy have fallen on deaf ears in the West:9 the advantage of mutual 
inspiration, the benefits from engaging with different ways of thinking, the philosoph-
ical call to engage with one’s own tacit assumptions, the inclusion of “others” as a 
salutary check on disciplinary self-deception, the need for philosophical pluralism in 
a globalizing world, the changing student population, the increasing relevance of 
Chinese masters, the intellectual duty to treat others with respect, appeals to intellec-
tual integrity, et cetera.10 Counter-arguments from Western philosophers have been 
less numerous (because less necessary) and often amount to a division of labor that 
somewhat condescendingly allows to China a wonderful sort of wisdom instead of 
philosophy.11
The fact that such claims by faculty members at Western Philosophy departments 
are hardly supported by any close reading or thorough investigation of the texts has 
led scholars of Chinese philosophy to accuse them of ignorance, intellectual lazi-
ness, and racist or chauvinistic ethnocentrism.12 Even though there is a great deal of 
truth both in the arguments in favor of Chinese philosophy and in these accusations, 
they also risk leaving something out. In other words, the continuous repetition of 
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apparently futile arguments alternating with mutual irritation indicates the existence 
of a sore spot. This is related, I have argued, to our emotional attachment to the insti-
tutions where we are trained. Since scholars at the Philosophy department are all 
hired on the basis of exclusively Western expertise, they understandably lack the 
time, interest, and language skills to judge the non-Western source material.13 Hence, 
their ignorance results from the vicious circle that the educational system perpetu-
ates: “Because we don’t know their work, they have little impact on our philosophy. 
Because they have little impact on our philosophy, we believe we are justified in 
 remaining ignorant about their work.”14 Since I agree with Robert Bernasconi that 
“more important than what academic philosophers think are the institutional prac-
tices they endorse,”15 the next step in my analysis consciously leaves behind 
 philosophical argumentation and focuses instead on institutional matters such as 
university curricula, course listings, appointments, research grants, the composition 
of committees, conferences, journal policies, ranking systems, job searches, and li-
brary categories.16 My double aim is to illustrate the European situation (part 2) and 
reflect on it (part 3).
Europe as Locus of Study
The focus on institutional matters forces us to narrow the attention to a second non-
place, namely Europe, which used to be subsumed under the broader category of 
“the West” in earlier discussions. But considering the institutional differences be-
tween the Anglo-Saxon (especially North American) world and Europe, this broad 
category is no longer workable. In very general terms and overlooking evolutions and 
variations, area-related studies can be roughly divided into two types. “Sinology” in 
Europe originated from Oriental studies, which for a long time focused on philology 
and a mix of types of expertise in the humanities; “China Studies” in the United 
States boomed during the Cold War, and focused on contemporary topics through a 
multidisciplinary lens with dominant attention to the social sciences.17
It is therefore not surprising that recent reflections on the (non-)place of Chinese 
philosophy by North American scholars have focused on the situation in the United 
States, sometimes touching on Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.18 Another rea-
son why information on the European situation is lacking is its own silence on this 
topic. This silence comes with gradations. There is, first, an academic silence in the 
sense that thus far the treatment of China (along with other non-Western regions) in 
the European academy has hardly been actively or systematically researched. When-
ever some scholars (usually from area-related studies) have discussed it, a second, 
equally passive type of silence consists in ignoring them.19 Third, an enforced silence 
is evidenced in the fact that attempts to speak up in the local media are being cen-
sored.20 The combination of these three types of silence must ring a bell for scholars 
of contemporary China.21
In this void of information, the current contribution starts in a somewhat artifi-
cially narrowed fashion by exploring one European academic institution in detail, 
namely my own: the University of Leuven, KU (Katholieke Universiteit) Leuven. It is 
located in Flanders, the northern region of Belgium, which is responsible for its 
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own education and research. Within KU Leuven, I further focus on two disciplines, 
namely History and Philosophy. Even though all sciences have been described as 
being determined by their particular place,22 this is all the more obvious for the hu-
manities, where knowledge of the places under scrutiny and their languages matters 
a great deal. The History department is selected to show that the academic exclusion 
of China is the result of not just a Western philosophical bias, but also of a more 
generally European one. The selected focus on two disciplines in one university is, 
admittedly, very narrow: it does not entail any comparison with other institutions in 
the region, nor does it take the specifics of other disciplines into account. However, 
I do believe that in a very general sense, the results can be cautiously extrapolated to 
the humanities and social sciences in the rest of Flanders and even much of Europe.23 
But for risking this bold claim, we need to jump to the third and most problematic 
non-place of this study.
The Academic Place of This Research
The relative futility of rational arguments in the legitimacy debate suggests that the 
expertise of most China scholars in, for example, Sinology, History, Religion, or Phi-
losophy may not equip us to comprehend fully the mechanisms that have consis-
tently excluded China (along with most other non-Western regions) from institutions 
that nevertheless claim to be broadly interested in the world. Experts in Sociology, 
Psychology, the Educational sciences, or even Anthropology might be better trained 
to study the academic habits, institutional attachments, dominant paradigms, discur-
sive regimes, and symbolic violence all functioning below the surface of rationality.24 
But these experts are generally uninterested in the systematic exclusion of China in 
their own institutions. This lack of expertise on one side combined with a lack of in-
terest on the other explains not only the academic silence but also the occasionally 
tentative tone of those China scholars who have spoken up. It is probably no coinci-
dence that major parts of the recent legitimacy debate in the West can be found in 
blogs, newsletters, journals, and internet communities; they rely heavily on circum-
stantial evidence such as conversations, personal anecdotes, and emails and phone 
calls to editors, deans, and chairs of search committees.25 Since area-related scholars 
are academically often not entitled (or funded)26 to do this type of research, and since 
those who might be entitled are unanimously uninterested, the current topic thus far 
has remained somewhat understudied.27
The awkwardness of being incapable, invisible, unnoticed, or sometimes even 
silenced results from falling between the niches of academic disciplines. At least in 
Europe, Sinology as an all-around study of China cannot be identified with any clear 
set of methodologies, except perhaps the art of “in-betweenness” itself. A significant 
part of the methodology of the area-specialist may result from wandering between 
regions and disciplines, and consist in suspending certainties by thinking aloud 
about the strangeness that is familiar to the field.28 An alternative illustration of this 
type of non-place could be Michel de Certeau’s image of the cartoon figure Felix 
the Cat briskly walking on the edge of a cliff and noticing too late that there is 
no  longer ground under his feet.29 Despite expertise in a China-related field (e.g., 
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philosophy or intellectual history) and years of experience within the academy, when 
they reflect upon the institutional system that shapes its members and frames their 
discourse, area-related scholars switch from being specialized experts to concerned 
intellectuals. And while hanging in the air over an academic cliff, they also drag 
their reluctant colleagues along into this void. However, by pointing at the fissures 
between the bones of our current educational body, I do not mean to challenge 
the expertise of the individual historians and philosophers presented anonymously 
in this essay, but only to highlight the institutional system that is largely taken for 
granted.
The focus on institutional data does not guarantee a serene atmosphere. On the 
contrary, the mere presentation of institutional information arouses emotional reac-
tions, since scholars are not addressed in their expertise but in its foundation. They 
feel held accountable for the general system in which they function rather than for 
their individual contribution to it. Similar to the way it is for Felix the Cat, the expe-
rience of hanging in the air over the academic cliff edge is indeed an uncomfortable 
exercise compared to being on top of the mountain engaged in the expert research 
for which one is hired and admired. When questioned on this fundamental level, 
scholars feel threatened and respond accordingly:30 they either keep silent or reduce 
critical remarks to the individual frustration of an ill-informed minority.31 I am there-
fore particularly grateful to those History and Philosophy scholars who have read this 
essay and commented on it.
II. A Glimpse at the History and Philosophy Departments at KU Leuven
One possible implication of the “in-between” metaphor is the glimpse-like nature 
of what can be seen. Far from claiming to reveal once and for all the “true facts” of 
the European academy, this essay takes no more than a snapshot of two disciplines 
at one university on the basis of their websites in the academic year 2015–2016.32 
The focus on such apparently irrelevant data as course listings, faculty hiring, and 
research programs is like peeping through a very narrow gap and describing the 
view. Behind my back is a plane of wider issues such as orientalism, neocolonialism, 
sinologism,33 and Sinology versus China studies, all topics that I will not tackle here. 
Beyond my data stretches a world that they represent: namely Europe, as the locus of 
research and teaching, and the “non-West” as the largely neglected object of exper-
tise. Even though regional areas cannot be easily distinguished into categories, I use 
the rough taxonomy in table 1 as a heuristic tool.
Table 1. Taxonomy of places as objects of expertise
Paradigmatic Non-West Partly Western Paradigmatic West
China, Japan, Korea, . . . Near East, the Slavonic world, 
Latin America, . . .
( Western) Europe, USA, Canada, . . .
1054 Philosophy East & West
While I consider China here as paradigmatic for the overlooked “non-West,” we 
could probably add many African and Arabic regions, or India and Indonesia (espe-
cially when studied in more than only Western sources). Paradigmatically “Western” 
regions are, along with Europe, the (mostly) English-writing world, including the 
U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. “Partly Western,” finally, are other 
 regions that historically, linguistically, religiously, or culturally are also associated 
with Europe, such as the Near East, the Slavonic world, and Latin America. While this 
division is far from perfect, as a temporary heuristic tool it is an improvement upon 
the outlandish opposition between the “non-West” and the “West.”
The data of this study concern such items as the structure of the institutes and the 
status of various Bachelor’s and Master’s courses: How many discuss or substantially 
“bring in” China? Are they optional or mandatory? What is the percentage of faculty 
members specializing in China, reading Chinese sources, publishing in Chinese, and 
attending Chinese conferences? Which percentage of Master’s theses, Ph.D. disserta-
tions, or research projects concern China? What is the regional expertise of their 
applicants, their supervisors, and the council members awarding the projects? And, 
last but not least, to what extent is the regional limitation of courses and research 
explicitly stated? For instance, is China as a topic simply left out in a course titled 
“Introduction to Philosophy” or rather in an “Introduction to Western Philosophy”? 
And if the latter is the case, do the lecture notes then explain or support this implicit 
limitation, for example by claiming a lack of expertise in non-Western matters or 
by stating that philosophy is inherently Western? Some of these questions will be 
explored in this essay.
There are limitations to such a project of institutional data collection on the basis 
of a university’s websites. Being no more reliable than its sources, the information 
may be contingent, cryptic, unclear, or even deficient. The exclusive focus on one 
moment in time, moreover, in this case the academic year 2015–2016, fails to show 
evolutions and may therefore no longer be representative for the situation today.34 
My general background information thus far suggests, however, that the data are 
nevertheless representative in a very general sense. Despite unmistakable evolutions 
toward broadening the regional scope, and notwithstanding important differences 
between the various disciplines, universities, and countries, I am confident that some 
of the information is also relevant for non-Western regions other than China.35
But my approach also has advantages. One is that it gives a voice to what  usually 
remains unspoken. For instance, the fact that universities locate non-Western thought 
outside the Philosophy department — like bookstores placing the Laozi between the 
sections on astrology and foot massage — consolidates a conviction that is seldom 
explicitly stated and defended. The websites, moreover, contain a remarkable tension 
between the department’s daily functioning in the face of these hard facts versus their 
self-representations and the flashy mission statements on their front pages.
The History Department at KU Leuven
The History department at KU Leuven belongs to the Faculty of Arts. Its curriculum 
consists of four years — three Bachelor’s years and one Master’s year — at least for the 
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“norm students” who proceed well in their studies. From the outset, the students 
choose between two trajectories: a minor one called “antiquity” (mostly ancient 
Greece and Rome) and a more general one, “from antiquity to the present.” The 
aim of the Bachelor’s program is that students gain insight into history, learn to treat 
sources critically, and grasp the connections between history and the other human 
sciences.36
Aside from a number of mandatory courses for all students (e.g., research skills, 
historical overviews of various periods in European history, and a course on intercul-
tural contacts), there are also some mandatory options (e.g., between text readings 
in various European languages, between various disciplines). For each of the two 
 trajectories — “antiquity” and “from antiquity to the present” — there is again a set of 
mandatory courses, optional courses, and modules. In the trajectory “from antiquity 
to the present,”37 there are four mandatory courses (including one on European col-
onization) and optional courses on the history of France, Great Britain, and Germany 
(two courses for each). The four modules are: “antiquity,” “contemporary society,” 
“broadening the scope” (mostly with various disciplines), and “world history” (of a 
variety of areas). In the last module, the students choose six courses from a list of 
twelve regional histories, two of which are on China (see table 2).
What is the place of China in this curriculum? It fully figures in the titles and 
course descriptions of two elective courses for students in the “world history” mod-
ule, within the “from antiquity to the present” trajectory (see *1* in table 2): “History 
of China till 1600” and “History of modern China.” As a result, history students at KU 
Leuven can easily graduate, and actually do, without having taken any courses on 
China or, for that matter, on any other non-Western region (two students chose Chi-
nese history, while sixty-seven students went for American history.38 The history of 
Africa or Congo is not even an option). Such courses are gathered in the list of elec-
tive courses within the “world history” module. To the department’s credit, the his-
tory program does express awareness of the importance of other than Western 
cultures and of the danger of European ethnocentrism, evidenced by the mandatory 
Table 2. Bachelor’s in History
 — Mandatory courses *2*
 — Optional courses
From Antiquity to the Present Antiquity
— Mandatory courses *3*
 — Optional courses
 — Mandatory courses
 — Optional courses
Antiquty Contemporary 
society
Broadening 
the scope
World history *1*
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course on intercultural contacts (see *2* in table 2) and the mandatory course on 
European colonization within the trajectory “from antiquity to the present” (see *3*). 
The former aims at “calling into question Eurocentric views of history,”39 while the 
latter “aims at showing and critically evaluating colonization history.”40
The Master’s program consists of one year in which students learn to “inde-
pendently and carefully describe a historical problem and thus learn to thoroughly 
understand the past and hence all human activities ” (italics added). Students can 
again choose between four profiles, namely the “middle ages,” “modern times,” 
“cultural history after 1750,” and “European society in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.” Except for this last profile, which explicitly indicates its regional demar-
cation in most course titles and content descriptions, there seems to be a dominant 
assumption that “all human activities” have taken place in the West.41
The fact that the Master’s program is, implicitly or explicitly, more restricted to 
the West (mostly to Europe) is because of the profile of the five research groups, four 
of which are implicitly or explicitly limited to the West in their self-descriptions: 
 “ancient history” (explicitly focused on ancient Greece and Rome),42 “medieval his-
tory” (explicitly Western),43 “early modern history” (explicitly focused on the Low 
Countries),44 “cultural history since 1750” (implicitly Western),45 and “modernity 
and society from 1800 to 2000” (explicitly global).46 These five research groups are 
home to all the staff members, among them twenty-five full-time professors. None of 
them does primary research on any “non-Western” topic. As a result, if any of these 
regions happens to be touched upon, it is never on the basis of sources in the relevant 
language, nor is it the central focus of attention. There is some work done on what 
I have identified as the “partly Western,” for example on Latin America and the 
 Slavonic world.47
Next, the research groups and areas of expertise determine the topics on which 
students are invited to write their Master’s thesis. There are more than four hundred 
topics proposed by almost forty staff members, including assisting and part-time fac-
ulty.48 The taxonomy “West,” “partly Western,” and “non-West” must be abandoned 
here, because almost all topics belong to a region within the first category, namely 
Europe. In figure 1 I have therefore adopted the following categories: (1) regions that 
more or less belong under what is today called Flanders and Belgium, including the 
Low Countries; (2) other regions that belong under what is now considered Europe; 
and (3) regions that are farther away, namely the “non-West,” the “partly Western,” 
and the non-European parts of the West (e.g., the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand). According to a tentative count, almost three hundred topics (equal to 75 
percent) belong to (1); about sixty-five topics (16 percent) belong to (2), and about 
thirty-five topics (9 percent) belong to (3).
Even when using all the data indicated in figure 1 with the necessary caution, the 
combined evidence of the History program’s structure, the status and content of 
the courses, the research groups and their projects, staff members’ expertise and 
projects, and the Master’s thesis topics of the academic year 2015–2016 all attest to 
the dominance of the home region, with an overwhelming focus on our own region. 
For North American scholars, “it would be unthinkable for departments of history, 
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religion, or art to have specialists only in European and Anglo-American history, re-
ligion, or art.”49 Here, the unthinkable is reality. Of course, some degree of regional 
focus on oneself is normal and legitimate, especially since only Belgian and Dutch 
scholars have the motivation and linguistic skills to undertake most of this specific 
research. There is also, moreover, a growing interest in regions farther away from 
home, not only in the two courses mentioned above (*2* and *3*), but also in a host 
of other correcting initiatives listed below (see part 3). But the academic interest 
in Flanders (a region with a geographical area somewhat less than 1/ 700th that of 
China), Belgium, and Europe is nevertheless disproportionate, and the corrections 
are thus far no more than ad hoc solutions that consolidate the basic frame.
Philosophy Department at KU Leuven
The Philosophy department at KU Leuven, called the Institute of Philosophy, is an 
independent institute, HIW (Hoger Instituut Wijsbegeerte), with the status of a  Faculty. 
It was founded in 1889, and over more than four decades it has had an international 
program completely run in English parallel with the one in Dutch. It has an impres-
sive number of faculty members — thirty-nine fully employed professors, along with 
a much longer list of partially employed and (partially active) retired faculty mem-
bers.50 The faculty members all belong to one of the Institute’s five research centers,51 
namely the “Center for Ethics, Social, and Political Philosophy” (implicitly West-
ern),52 the “Center for Logic and Analytic Philosophy” (explicitly analytic philosophy),53 
the “Center for Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophy of Culture” 
(implicitly Western),54 the “De Wulf-Mansion Center for Ancient, Medieval, and 
 Renaissance Philosophy” (implicitly Western),55 and finally the “Husserl Archives 
Center for Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy” (explicitly Western).56
The standard curriculum consists of three Bachelor’s years, one Master’s year, 
and one more year for a research Master’s (M.Phil.) for students focusing on research. 
Figure 1. Proposed Master’s thesis topics in History.
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The Institute wants to acquaint students “with the historical traditions of philosophy 
as well as with contemporary movements in English-speaking and continental phi-
losophy,” thus offering “a broad philosophical education.”57 The fact that interna-
tional students “from America to China, from India and the Philippines to Mexico” 
study there accounts for its international atmosphere. Hence, to “practice philosophy 
looking at the whole world: in Leuven it is reality!”58
Let us focus on the Dutch program, which is older and more elaborate than the 
international one, but not fundamentally different. The three Bachelor’s years consist 
of a part shared by all students (truncus communis) and an elective option. The for-
mer contains ten basic courses, seven historical overviews, one research skill course 
supported by one seminar to be chosen from the five research options, and one 
course on religion (see table 3). Within the truncus communis students also have to 
choose one course from either the list of twelve “socio-ethical” courses or “world 
philosophies,” including “Chinese philosophy,” “Arabic philosophy,” “Jewish philos-
ophy,” “Russian Philosophy,” and “East-West perspectives in philosophy.” The sec-
ond, elective part of the program consists of ten modules, including “general option,” 
“law,” “physics,” and “economy.”
What is the place of China (or any other non-Western region) in this curriculum? 
As for the truncus communis, China figures explicitly in the title of one elective 
course that can be chosen from two lists of altogether more than fifteen courses, and 
perhaps implicitly in the course “East-West perspectives” on the same list (see *1*). 
Moreover, within one of the modules, the one called “general,” the choice of one 
world philosophy course is no longer optional but mandatory (*2*). Hence, with one 
elective course for all students and one mandatory course within one elective mod-
ule out of ten, the large majority of philosophy students at KU Leuven can and do 
graduate without having taken any courses on any non-Western or partly Western 
philosophy, let alone on Chinese thought.59 At the same time, the title of the list 
“world philosophies” does suggest that, in one way or another, non-Western thought 
is also considered philosophy.
The Master’s program, according to the website, “crosses the boundaries of all 
philosophical disciplines, traditions, and approaches” to help students form their 
“own well-rounded view.”60 While students can still choose a world philosophy, the 
courses at this stage are even more exclusively Western because of the stronger con-
Table 3. Bachelor’s in Philosophy
 — Mandatory courses: basics, history courses, religion, research skills
(including the selection of one seminar)
 — Elective course: either socio-ethics or world philosophies *1*
General *2* Law Sociology Psychology History Physics
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nection with the Institute’s own expertise at its research centers. Students also write 
a thesis under the guidance of a faculty member. The list for 2015–2016 contains the 
proposals of fifty-five potential supervisors with their own expertise.61 Since nobody 
focuses on Flanders or Belgium alone, the taxonomy “West,” “partly Western,” and 
“non-West” can be applied, even though the last category remains empty (see figure 
2). If any regional division can be roughly made, it is between Continental (around 
four fifths) and Anglo-Saxon (around one fifth).
Considering the location of Leuven at the center of Europe and its long-standing 
tradition, the prevalence of Continental topics is not surprising. With Russian and 
Jewish philosophy, there is also some expertise on what I have identified as the 
 “partly Western.”62 There is no expert available for students who might want to work 
on the other so-called world philosophies or non-Western thought. With eleven col-
leagues counting Kant among their research topics, and eight mentioning Foucault, 
there is a total absence of expertise on Confucius, Mozi, Mencius, Laozi, Zhuangzi, 
Xunzi, Shang Yang, Shen Buhai, Shen Dao, Han Feizi, Guanzi, Heguanzi, Huainanzi, 
Shizi,63 Wang Chong, Lu Jia, Jia Yi, Huan Tan, Liu Xin, Dong Zhongshu, Yang Xiong, 
Liezi, Lu Sheng, Han Yu, Li Ao, Liu Zongyuan, Luo Yin, Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, 
Cheng Yi, Cheng Hao, Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming, Li Zhi, Fu Shan, Wang Gen, He 
 Xinyin, Wang Fuzhi, Wang Zhong, Fang Dongshu, Weng Fanggang, Gu Yanwu, 
Zhang Xuecheng, Huang Zongxi, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan, Wu Yu, 
Hu Shi, Feng  Youlan, Fu Sinian, Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Mou Zongsan, Qiang 
Zhongshu, Tang Junyi, and Li Zehou, to name only some. However important Kant 
and Foucault  undeniably are, one wonders if they really offset the totality of all 
Figure 2. Available Master’s thesis expertise in Philosophy.
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 Chinese thinkers, not to mention the Arabic, Japanese, Indian, Latin-American, and 
African ones.64
Again, taking the data with the necessary grain of salt, this combined evidence 
of the Philosophy program’s structure, the courses, the research centers, their  awarded 
projects, and the supervisors’ expertise shows that there is an even more overwhelm-
ing, but mostly implicit bias in favor of the West than in the History department. The 
proclaimed “international atmosphere” at the Institute is apparently considered an 
automatic result of the fact that the student population comes from various countries; 
it is not visibly related to the faculty’s intellectual openness toward different ways of 
thinking. Crossing the boundaries “of all philosophical disciplines, traditions, and 
approaches” does not take one beyond the West.
III. Europe and Philosophy
As David Livingstone has argued, science has a geography, despite its practitioners’ 
claim to a placeless place and their efforts to transcend the parochial.65 Within the 
humanities and also in the social sciences, Livingstone’s statement is not as contro-
versial as it might have been in the natural sciences. But even within the humanities, 
disciplines all differ in their double treatment of places: those they inhabit and those 
they study. Anthropology, for instance, thrives on the study of the other; and in many 
non-European universities, the non-West has some place within departments. I have 
chosen to focus on one discipline aside from Philosophy, namely History, which is 
remarkably similar and yet undeniably different. In their similarity both departments 
are somewhat representative of the “soft sciences” (mostly the humanities, but also 
the social sciences) in the European context. But the fact that in its ethnocentric 
stance the KU Leuven Philosophy department resembles those in the United States 
also indicates some typically Western philosophical traits — hence the difference. The 
situation of Chinese (and other non-Western) philosophy at KU Leuven (and at other 
European philosophy departments) can thus tentatively be divided into two parts: 
being European, it differs gradually from the rest of the world (see “Soft Sciences in 
Europe” below); being philosophy, it differs gradually from other disciplines (see 
“Philosophy Being Philosophy” below). The overlap between both aspects and the 
gradual differences between regions and disciplines tend to blur the distinction be-
tween being European and being philosophy.
Soft Sciences in Europe
Imagine a Flemish (Belgian, European) youngster interested in the history of the Tai-
ping Rebellion (1850 –1864), a civil war in which an estimated twenty to thirty million 
people died. What should she study? Before answering this question, I must admit 
that this case is highly hypothetical since, like most events in Chinese (and non- 
Western) history, the Taiping Rebellion is unknown and never mentioned in Belgian 
high schools. But what if? In Belgium, this student would have to study Sinology, 
where she would learn about China’s culture and history, practice its language and 
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script, read primary and secondary sources in a variety of languages, and be urged to 
take as many methodology courses as possible at the History department. In the 
United States, this student would aim for a History department where Chinese  history 
is taught and researched. The same holds for Chinese universities treating topics of 
Western or world history.
In an attempt to make the difference visual, we could project the underlying 
 institutional framework onto one line, reaching from an area-focused training (in 
casu China) at one extreme to a disciplinary expertise (in casu History) at the other 
(see figure 3). The middle of the line would indicate scholars who are well trained in 
both: acquainted with the methodologies, trends, ways of thinking, terminology, and 
discourses within their discipline while at the same time knowing well the region of 
research and being fluent in its main language(s) so as to be able to read sources, 
attend conferences, create networks, and gain a sense of belonging there.
I believe that KU Leuven is representative of most European universities in keep-
ing the two extremes farther apart than many universities in the rest of the world, 
even in poor countries.66 While the disciplines at one extreme are exclusively local 
(at most touching upon China in the margin of a course), the area-related studies at 
the other side submerge the student in a bath of regional expertise (with minimal 
training in specific methodologies). Only in a second step would scholars on both 
sides move toward the middle by learning, respectively, the languages or the 
 methodologies of the discipline. The disadvantages of the European system have 
been abundantly exposed in the ongoing Discipline-versus-Area-Studies controversy. 
Without resuming this debate, let me point out three weaknesses that are more prom-
inent in the European system.
One immediate result of the fact that discipline experts are hardly trained in 
any region beyond their own is the remarkable lack of knowledge of the Chinese, 
Japanese, or Arab world, not only at universities but also beyond: in schools, media, 
Figure 3. Institutional frame of regions and disciplines at KU Leuven.
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and public debates.67 Second, since scholars almost exclusively think in terms of 
supposedly universal disciplines, doing interdisciplinary research (e.g., combining 
History with Economics, or Philosophy with Physics) is, in their eyes, the climax of 
all-around scholarship, even though it largely remains restricted to only one part of 
the globe. Due to the absence of truly challenging voices from outside, there is the 
risk of a lack of novelty, flexibility, and self-criticism. Hence, most European academ-
ics think about themselves as the center of the world, possessing all the uncontested 
concepts and criteria for evaluating others.68 A third and last problem, specifically for 
area-related scholars, is that research funding is determined by committees made up 
almost exclusively of faculty from those disciplines. The FWO (Fonds Wetenschap-
pelijk Onderzoek, or Fund for Scientific Research) in Flanders is a case in point. The 
current panel of sixteen experts granting philosophy projects are all based in Philos-
ophy departments and have expertise in exclusively Western disciplines.69 A project 
on Chinese philosophy, therefore, may have some hurdles to jump in order to be 
awarded: compete with more familiar, Western projects; include enough regional 
explanation in order to be comprehensible; use a discourse that the experts recog-
nize as being philosophical; and show acquaintance with the most recent scholar-
ship within at least one branch of their philosophical expertise.70
On the basis of this description, non-European scholars may feel confirmed in 
their dismissal of European scholarship. The situation is better than it seems, how-
ever. I therefore want to add two important nuances to the picture painted above. 
Without rehearsing long-standing arguments in favor of Area Studies such as (New) 
Sinology, I will first point out one possible richness of the system itself, and then turn 
to the corrections that are being made to address its inherent biases. As for the for-
mer, in the long range of types of expertise between the two extremes, one can look 
at China in a variety of ways, ranging from discipline specialists who have hardly any 
acquaintance with the language and the region (situated on the extreme right side), 
moving over to those having learned some Chinese, toward the “old China hands” 
who are without any disciplinary expertise (on the extreme left side). Without doubt, 
a double expertise somewhere around the middle of the spectrum is to be ap plauded. 
But I would not exclude the possibility that discipline scholars working on the West 
may have something very worthwhile to say about China, not just despite their lack 
of area-expertise but sometimes even because of it.71 In the field of Chinese phi-
losophy, Herbert Fingarette is a case in point. Without much knowledge of China 
or Chinese, he gave an enormous boost to Confucius-related scholarship.72 On the 
other side, Simon Leys (Pierre Ryckmans) represents in my eyes the all-around China 
scholar undisturbed by the confines of any specific discipline.73 These examples 
show that fine experts positioned in the wide range from discipline to area are not an 
exclusively European phenomenon. Such admittedly exceptional examples illustrate 
the value of a variety of academic profiles, sometimes even including the lack of 
training as a possible asset.
A second reason that makes life in the European academy tolerable is the fact 
that the constraints of the system are increasingly recognized and addressed, not 
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only by open-minded faculty members but also on an institutional level. Without 
fundamentally changing the dominant paradigm itself, the two departments de-
scribed above have made resourceful attempts to meet the demands of an  increasingly 
global world: they have elective courses on the non-West (including China); occa-
sionally refer to non-Western regions (including China) in other courses; reflect upon 
topics such as Eurocentrism, exclusion, and symbolic violence (in other cases than 
the one discussed here); invite visiting scholars and doctoral students working on 
the non-West (including China);74 collaborate extensively with colleagues from the 
area-related studies (including Sinology); invite them to give lectures and contribute 
papers; welcome them on their advisory boards or evaluation committees; and have 
become increasingly explicit about the regional demarcations of their courses, mod-
ules, profiles, and projects. They also make serious attempts to honor funding appli-
cations for projects on non-Western topics. Within the confines of a hardly contested 
system, my experience is that most colleagues try to be fair and generous, as long as 
the Eurocentric frame is not fundamentally questioned.
For all these reasons, China — along with other non- or partially Western regions — 
can be researched at KU Leuven; even within this system, area-related scholars are 
relatively well off. They are indeed subjected to an implicit form of more-or-less 
 institutional discrimination (depending on the department and the discipline) as 
 described above, but not more severe than a variety of other types of injustice on 
the basis of gender, race, provenance, age, social class, sexual orientation, health, or 
genetics. Like myself, almost all area-related scholars working at European universi-
ties receiving a salary to do research and teach students are generally on the side 
of the privileged in most types of discrimination. Moreover, while the slow but 
steady attempts undertaken within the system to address some inequalities are to be 
applauded, discrimination is also a valuable experience, as long as it is limited. It 
increases one’s empathy for those who are suffering much more from various types 
of hardly acknowledged unfairness. The real victims of this bias are therefore not 
the current area-related scholars at European universities, but the future generations 
that are taught by teachers and informed by journalists who are all educated in a 
system that does not prepare them for a respectful communication with and a thor-
ough understanding of the increasingly growing non-Western world.
Philosophy Being Philosophy
But this European bias is only one part of the picture. Despite the similarities be-
tween the History and Philosophy departments at KU Leuven accounted for by being 
European, there are also major differences. Compared to Philosophy, History in gen-
eral has been more open to accommodate China in a global framework. To begin 
with, the existence of such a thing as “Chinese history” is not questioned.75 While 
History courses and research projects tend to name explicitly the region of their 
 research — “History of the Netherlands” or “History of European colonization” — 
Philosophy courses exude more universal ambitions, carrying generic titles such 
as “Ethics,” “Logic,” or “Metaphysics,” while actually being limited to Western 
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thought. The universal ambitions of the Philosophy department thus go hand in hand 
with a much stronger and implicit regional restriction. With research topics in His-
tory ranging from the smallest Flemish archive to intercontinental evolutions, most 
philosophical topics are limited to the West. I therefore also wonder what to make 
“of the apparent tension between the alleged universality of reason and the fact that 
its  upholders are so intent on localizing its historical instantiation.”76
The exclusion of Chinese thought from European Philosophy departments — at 
least at KU Leuven — only gradually differs from the United States. Even though some 
programs in the U.S.A. have compulsory courses on non-Western philosophies, and 
have fully or partially appointed faculty with expertise in Chinese philosophy,77 the 
Philosophy departments in general remain champions of exclusion within the acad-
emy. It has been pointed out that “[N]o other humanities discipline demonstrates this 
systematic neglect of most of the civilizations in its domain.”78 Brian Bruya has 
 argued on the basis of game theory that the ethnocentric reflex of Western philos-
ophy may not disappear soon.79 Crowdsourcing experiments, moreover, show that 
groups perceiving themselves as homogeneous consistently express high confidence 
about their superiority even though they are actually less creative and successful than 
diverse groups.80 This also does not sound promising for the cur rently exclusively 
Western (and still predominantly white and male)81 philosophy departments.
But there are ways to cope with this. The easiest one would be to rename the 
department “Institute of Western Philosophy” and consequently add regional speci-
fications to the course titles. For KU Leuven, this would be a costless and honorable 
option. The Philosophy Institute really is a wonderful place of lively intellectual re-
flection on Western, and mostly Continental thought. Pride of this heritage is a legit-
imate driving force. It may even be a necessary ingredient for Western philosophers 
to speak with authority, even when Europe as the center of the world has become a 
phantom. As Dabashi points out, Europe still “has much to teach the world, but now 
on a far more leveled and democratic playing field, where its philosophy is European 
philosophy not ‘Philosophy’.”82
The rejection of this option (at least thus far) by the Institute of Philosophy is 
 because philosophy, as opposed to history, is considered by many faculty members 
an exclusively Western cultural artifact, like Red Port being inherently Portuguese 
and shadowboxing (taijiquan 太極拳) being Chinese: just as the Polish people do not 
 insist on having invented Red Port and Westerners do not claim to always have had 
their own type of shadowboxing, non-Europeans should not insist on having had 
philosophy in the past. According to a view that dates from the late eighteenth cen-
tury, philosophy is a European cultural artifact that did not exist elsewhere before 
being internationally exported.83 As I argued over a decade ago, this position can be 
rationally defended depending on one’s definition of philosophy, an issue that ac-
cording to philosophers is open to debate — but apparently only among the members 
of a restricted club.84
More importantly, this position is to a large extent the expression of a status quo 
in Western Philosophy departments, not of any close knowledge of the relevant 
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 material. Although a lack of knowledge may be considered deplorable, the individ-
ual professional philosophers can be excused by their very training: “When Ph.D. 
students can go through their entire graduate education without ever encountering 
non-Western thought, it will be difficult to get them to take these traditions seriously 
once they are professional philosophers themselves.”85 They are to be blamed, how-
ever, when the very lack of expertise becomes a condition to be accepted as a phi-
losopher by the champions of open-mindedness. As Amy Olberding has shown, 
Western philosophers are consistently suspicious of colleagues in the field (with a 
Ph.D. in Philosophy) who use non-Western languages in their research. Broaden-
ing one’s scope by learning about other regions is not considered an indication of 
greater cosmopolitanism but of a deviant and eccentric boutique interest in marginal 
topics.86
The position that I find offensive, however, is an ethnocentric conservatism 
couched in a discourse of global pretensions. Whether one chooses explicitly to 
 restrict the department to Western philosophy or one considers philosophy an in-
herently Western artifact, one should defend this parochial position with pride. 
Claims about international reaches and boundary crossing do not fit well into this 
picture. Mission statements and self-presentations of philosophy departments or jour-
nals abound with terms such as “global,” “inclusive,” “breadth,” “comprehensive,” 
“cosmopolitan,” “wide range,” “crossing boundaries,” “rational,” and “critical,” 
which are in sharp contrast with their conservative attitude.87 The FWO is a case in 
point: it has a logo, “Opening new horizons,” with a long explanation online of how 
it “does not think in traditional thought patterns,” while in fact it does no more than 
reinforce the institutional biases of the local universities.88 Like the Leuven Institute 
for Philosophy, the FWO may be international in attracting scholars from all over 
the world, but it is not at all groundbreaking or boundary crossing in its vision and 
respect for other cultures.89
Figure 4. The FWO logo.
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IV. Conclusion
Scholars inevitably function within a framework or paradigm that determines the 
relevance and meaning of what they study. Most disciplines, however, undertake 
 attempts to cultivate a healthy skepticism and an openness to what challenges this 
framework. Philosophy departments, the self-proclaimed advocates of reflection and 
skepticism, are an exception. The closest they come to accepting novelty is when it 
is not disturbing: “Show us something we have not seen before, but be sure it looks 
well and truly familiar to us too.”90 For this reason, contemporary scholars of Chinese 
philosophy have found it increasingly futile to rehearse arguments for greater diver-
sity.91 Since the unquestioned Western framework determines what can — and what 
cannot — be studied, I have focused here on the description and analysis of this 
framework in a specific, European context.
Hence, without adding any philosophical arguments for the acceptance of 
 Chinese (or any other non-Western) philosophy, or appealing to the philosophical 
quality of Chinese texts or their current research,92 I will restrict my suggestions here 
to two institutional matters, one relatively easy and superficial, the second more dif-
ficult and fundamental. Because of the institutional focus of this essay, the arguments 
that I put forward are not philosophical, nor do they specifically address professional 
philosophers, but rather appeal to concerned citizens and intellectuals who might 
at some point have a say in how our educational system is shaped. I appeal to 
such unphilosophical matters as the increasing non-Western student population, the 
growing economic and political power of non-Western countries, and the importance 
of diplomacy. When dealing with other countries and cultures, it does no harm to 
show them some degree of respect — even in their supposedly mistaken claim to 
have philosophy — especially now that the West is losing its position of uncontested 
leader of the world. Despite the undeniable disadvantages of institutional top-down 
changes, I think that most European Philosophy departments will only open up to 
the world when forced to do so. As with other types of positive action (e.g., gender 
and racial equality), changes will take time and meet with resistance from within the 
system.
The first change that I suggest entails no extra cost: students in all Humanities 
and Social Sciences disciplines should be expected to take one or two courses in 
truly unfamiliar regions of their own choice. By studying African history, Japanese 
politics, Arabic law, or Chinese philosophy, students not only learn about other re-
gions, but also encounter alien terminology, concerns, questions, debates, points of 
view, and historical settings. Uncomfortable though this obligation originally may 
be, such an academic experience takes students out of their comfort zone and  thereby 
instills self-reflection. The concrete implementation of this suggestion needs further 
reflection depending on the department. In Philosophy, for instance, courses  provided 
with an ethnic label such as “Chinese philosophy” are far from ideal: not only are 
they ridiculously broad in scope,93 they also suggest some essential characteristics 
(Chineseness) by which those philosophies would deviate from the supposedly neu-
tral norm.94 While a variety of specifications can be considered, I think that courses 
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with generic titles such as “Introduction to philosophy” should simply be informed 
by more than only Western content, and that the inevitable regional limitation of 
each course should be explicitly indicated.
Therefore, a second and more important institutional step would be for the disci-
plines to hire faculty with firsthand expertise in other regions: someone who reads 
Arabic at the Philosophy department, Japanese for Law, Korean for Sociology, Hindi 
for Anthropology, Chinese for Religious Studies, et cetera. This is already a reality in 
the non-European world, except for most Philosophy departments in the West. Thus, 
when a vacancy comes up in Philosophy, we could spare a bit of expertise on Kant 
or Foucault to cede some institutional space — possibly in a double appointment with 
Area Studies — to a specialist of, for example, Kang Youwei, Nishida Kitarō, Homi 
Bhabha, or Uma Narayan. What would be lost aside from this (half ) position? Strictly 
speaking, nothing would be expected from the current faculty members, who could 
continue to do what they were hired for: Western philosophy. They would not be 
expected to suddenly introduce any Arabic or Chinese ideas into their own research 
or teaching: forced appropriations of foreign ideas risk being superficial and patron-
izing. Nor would they be asked to show any interest in non-Western thought, just as 
they are currently often politely indifferent to their colleagues’ research in the depart-
ment.95 It is not even necessary that they consider Arabic or Chinese thought interest-
ing, relevant, or philosophical. But in the long run the mere presence of outsiders 
would allow teaching on the basis of a close acquaintance with the relevant region, 
and hopefully stimulate interaction with at least some students and colleagues. If the 
political and institutional authorities believe that it is time to show respect to other 
cultures and countries, they could make it happen.
But this is 2016, exactly the five-hundredth anniversary of Thomas More’s  Utopia, 
which was first published in my hometown, Leuven, in the year 1516. My threefold 
reflection on non-place is utopian in both the negative and positive senses. On the 
one hand, it is an illusion to hope that change will happen anytime soon, considering 
the inertia of the system and the tardiness with which Philosophy departments cede 
place to women and non-white people. But it is also a dream. More than seven 
 hundred years ago there was a strong resistance in Paris against a foreign philosophy 
that, according to many university professors, did not fit in with the curriculum and 
was not of high quality anyway. But after student riots and debates, the reformers 
won, and European philosophy was enriched by Arab sources conveying Aristotle’s 
thought.96 Why would our philosophers not be able to repeat this feat sometime in 
the future?
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1   –   In Defoort 2001, pp. 407– 409, and Defoort 2006, pp. 637– 642, I argued that 
the terms “Chinese” and “philosophy” to some extent function as family names, 
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and therefore entail a complex combination of conceptual vagueness with 
emotional attachment.
2   –   Along with Western philosophy. Almost all Chinese (and Asian) Philosophy 
 departments teach various courses on at least Western (and sometimes also 
Chinese) philosophy.
3   –   See, e.g., Schwitzgebel 2015.
4   –   See, e.g., Angle 2008, p. 2; Van Norden 2008, p. 5; and Weber 2017, p. 384. 
Some scholars of Chinese thought have also pointed out possible advantages of 
operating outside the confines of the Philosophy department; see McLeod 2016, 
pp. 15–17.
5   –   Defoort 2001, Defoort 2006, and Defoort 1999.
6   –   See, e.g., Tiwald 2008, p. 7, and Garfield and Van Norden 2016. The two sides 
cannot be sharply distinguished. “Chinese side” means mostly Chinese and, 
secondarily, China/Sinology scholars. For a selection of Chinese views on this 
topic, see the issues of Contemporary Chinese Thought edited by Defoort and 
Ge 2005, 2005–2006, and 2006.
7   –   According to Robert Bernasconi (1997, pp. 212–214) and Peter Park (2013, 
p. 2), the view that philosophy was exclusively Greek and hence European 
dates from the late eighteenth century and quickly became orthodoxy.
8   –   The view that some Chinese masters were philosophers was assumed by West-
erners in their first encounters with China, and became an explicit conviction 
in China at the beginning of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Bernasconi 1997 
and Defoort 2006, pp. 631– 632.
9   –   There are, of course, various counter-examples, several of which are quoted in 
the present essay. See, e.g., Bernasconi 1997 and Solomon 2001.
10   –   See, e.g., Angle 2008, p. 3; Ames 2008, p. 3; Tiwald 2008, p. 7; Im 2008, p. 8; 
Struhl 2010, pp. 288–289; Bruya 2015b, p. 384; Schwitzgebel 2015; Garfield 
and Van Norden 2016; Ganeri 2016, p. 135; and Olberding 2016, p. 8.
11   –   See, e.g., Ganeri 2016, p. 136; Defoort and Ge 2005, pp. 3, 5– 6; and Garuba 
2012, p. 47, on African thought. See also the opinions quoted in Wu 1998.
12   –   For some recent statements, see, e.g., Van Norden 2008, pp. 4 –5; Jiang 2011, 
p. 168; Schwitzgebel 2015; Garfield and Van Norden 2016; Ganeri 2016, 
p. 134; Huang 2016, p. 18; Cleary 2016; Cline 2016, p. 11; and Van Norden 
2016a, p. 24. Paradoxically, one of the few arguments given by Western philos-
ophers is that many classical Chinese texts lack argumentation.
13   –   The majority of this material has not been translated. Furthermore, the transla-
tion into (modern) Chinese, Japanese, or other languages is often at the very 
core of philosophical debates, since translations are inevitably carriers of as-
sumptions and implicit worldviews.
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14   –   Schwitzgebel 2015.
15   –   Bernasconi 1997, p. 213.
16   –   “Institutional” refers broadly to our universities and funding institutions,  primary 
and secondary education, cultural and political institutions, down to the orga-
nization of bookstores.
17   –   For more details, see Defoort and Standaert 1997a, pp. 405– 408; Wallerstein 
2004, pp. 7–11; Bernasconi 1997; Hung 2004; Zürcher 2007; Garuba 2012, 
pp. 41– 43, related to Africa; and LIAS 2016, pp. 1–5. For inspiring attempts to 
combine the best of both, see, e.g., Barmé 2005 on “New Sinology” and LIAS 
2016, pp. 5–10, on “New area studies,” including a long reading list of relevant 
material.
18   –   Recent debates focus on the United States or the English-speaking world. See, 
e.g., Im et al. 2006 –2008; Olberding 2008, 2016, and 2017; Angle 2008; Ames 
2008; Van Norden 2008; Tiwald 2008; Im 2008; Wong 2008; Jiang 2002 and 
2011; Struhl 2010; Schwitzgebel 2015; Bruya 2015b and 2016; Garfield and 
Van Norden 2016; Cleary 2016; and McLeod 2016.
19   –   See, e.g., Defoort and Standaert 1997a, Defoort 2015a, and Defoort 2015b 
about the absence of China (and other non-Western regions) in all of Flanders’ 
Social Sciences and Humanities. Meetings over the last decades with presidents 
of our university, vice-presidents of research, deans, the head of the FWO, 
members of FWO reflection boards, and colleagues have aroused little more 
than TINA (“there is no alternative”) reactions.
20   –   Following one single attempt to discuss the situation in a short newspaper 
 article (“Een onzichtbare loper voor censuur,” De Standaard, February 8, 2016), 
I was urged to remove the item from our Faculty website (email of 08/02/2016).
21   –   As Yu Jiyuan, professor of ancient Greek and Chinese philosophy at Buffalo, 
points out in an interview, “The Chinese academic world is surprisingly free. . . . 
But you cannot publish some of those things in a newspaper, or talk about them 
to a Western journalist.” See Romano 2013.
22   –   Livingstone 2003, pp. 1–3.
23   –   For some European counter-examples, see, e.g., recent evolutions at the 
 Philosophy department of Leiden University (Netherlands). The philosophical 
pluralism at University College Cork (Ireland) described by Julia Jansen (2013, 
pp. 128–129) has largely become a matter of the past with the departure of 
Hans-Georg Müller and Graham Parkes. An overview of the situation in Europe 
from 2007 to 2014 contains more detailed information; see Weber 2017.
24   –   My own expertise in these fields is limited. I have a Ph.D. in Sinology (1993), 
two MA degrees in Philosophy — from the University of Hawai‘i (1990) and 
from KU Leuven (1993) — and course transcripts in Chinese philosophy from 
National Taiwan University (1986).
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25   –   See, e.g., Im et al. 2008, p. 8; Schwitzgebel 2015; Bruya 2015b, p. 381; Olber-
ding 2016, pp. 3– 6, and 2017; McLeod 2016, p. 13; and Huang 2016, p. 18.
26   –   For the first time in my career, my contribution to an academic conference 
(this paper for the Eleventh East-West Philosophers’ Conference, May 2016) 
was deemed unworthy of travel reimbursement because of “the unclear meth-
odology and unclear results” of my research (FWO letter of March 10, 2016).
27   –   Bruya 2015b, p. 369. Exceptions are, e.g., Amy Olberding and Brian Bruya, 
both scholars of Chinese philosophy who have done thorough research on the 
gatekeeping practices and institutional resistance of Western philosophers. 
There exists also a wealth of studies that are in one way or another closely 
 related to this topic, undertaken by either area-related scholars or scholars of 
Sociology/Anthropology. A combination of both is Joris Luyendijk, a journalist 
who has been trained in Arabic studies as well as Anthropology. For his popular 
analysis of Western media on Near Eastern topics, see Luyendijk [2006] 2015.
28   –   This predicament is, of course, far from exclusive for area-related scholars and 
may have become constitutive of the human condition in an increasingly  global 
world. See, e.g., Defoort and Standaert 1997a, pp. 411– 412; Standaert 2015; 
and Defoort 2015c.
29   –   See De Kesel 1996, pp. 122–123.
30   –   “Any attempt to reopen the question of the origin of philosophy tends to be 
treated as an attack on philosophy: it threatens cherished conceptions of philos-
ophy and reason” (Bernasconi 1997, p. 213).
31   –   Reduction of criticism to “a small minority” when the government can no  longer 
keep silent is also a commonly used response in contemporary Chinese propa-
ganda. See, e.g., Black and Munro 1993.
32   –   The institutional information below is restricted to their locations in the city of 
Leuven; it does not include the other academic settings of the larger KU Leuven 
Association set up in 2002.
33   –   See, e.g., Hung 2004, Chan 2012, Gu 2013, and Ganeri 2016.
34   –   A positive side effect of this limitation in time is that the constantly changing 
institutional jargon — “faculty,” “sub-faculty,” “department,” “research unit,” 
and “research group” — is used relatively consistently. Since these terms are 
very volatile, a study over various years would be confusing. Even now, the 
chosen jargon is not always intuitively clear. Sinology, Japanese studies, Ancient 
Greek studies, Near Eastern studies, and Slavonic studies nowadays constitute 
one “research unit” but are not expected to do research together.
35   –   For other “non-Western” regions, see, e.g., Goto-Jones 2005 on Japan, Garuba 
2012 on Africa, and Dabashi 2013.
36   –   https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/2015/opleidingen/n/CQ_50268976.htm 
(accessed May 14, 2016). By “human sciences” (humane wetenschappen) the 
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authors refer to “social sciences,” including the humanities. The categories 
 “social sciences,” “human sciences,” and “humanities” are not always easy to 
distinguish clearly. See https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/2015/opleidingen/ 
n/CQ_50268976.htm (accessed May 14, 2016).
37   –   I do not further elaborate on the “antiquity” trajectory since it is a minor option 
and contains no courses on China or any other non-Western region.
38   –   This was on average the case in the last two years (2014 –2015 and 2015–2016) 
(emails of June 28 and July 5, 2016). In 2015–2016, of the graduating students 
3.12 percent had chosen a course on Chinese history.
39   –   The course touches upon the Silk Route. See https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven 
.be/syllabi/v/e/F0LA9AE.htm#activetab=doelstellingen_idp796864&bl=all (ac-
cessed July 9, 2016).
40   –   The course has a chapter on Asia (including a part on China). See https:// 
onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/syl labi/e/F0UJ5AE.htm#activetab= 
doelstellingen_idp34688 (accessed May 14, 2016).
41   –   Or what I have labeled the “partly Western.” There is one elective course on the 
history of Brazil. See https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/2015/opleidingen/n/
CQ_50310751.htm (accessed May 14, 2016).
42   –   “Graeco-Roman world from about 800 b.c. to 650 a.d. mainly on the basis of 
written sources. The research unit contains two sections. The section ‘Helle-
nism’ focuses on documentary sources, the section ‘Ancient Historiography’ 
on narrative sources” (http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/oudegeschiedenis/english 
[accessed May 14, 2016]).
43   –   It “explores the western Middle Ages from a viewpoint of continuity between 
the Middle Ages and Late Antiquity, on the one hand, and the Early Modern 
period, on the other” (http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/middeleeuwen/english [ac-
cessed May 14, 2016]).
44   –   “. . . particular attention is given to the study of the Low Countries (and its sur-
rounding regions) within their global context, from roughly the late fifteenth 
until the eighteenth century” (http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/nieuwetijd/english 
[accessed May 14, 2016]).
45   –   No regional limitation is explicitly mentioned, but all research is about the 
West (http://www.arts.kuleuven.be/cultuurgeschiedenis/en [accessed May 14, 
2016]).
46   –   “. . . in a Belgian, European and global perspective” (http://www.arts.kuleuven 
.be/mosa/english [accessed May 14, 2016]). This group is further divided into 
four: “Mobility and globalization” (including research on, e.g., Poland and 
 India), “Identities and mobilization” (including Poland and Chile), “Policy and 
politics” (including Poland, Slovakia, Central Europe, and Africa), and  “Churches 
and religions.”
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47   –   See https://www.arts.kuleuven.be/geschiedenis/personeel (accessed May 14, 
2016), “persons connected to this unit,” only counting “independent academic 
personnel” (ZAP), including emeriti who are still teaching.
48   –   Based on “1516onderwerpen-masterproefGESCH20150914.xlsx.” Evidence 
gained from such data is problematic for the reasons discussed under 
“Europe as Locus of Study,” and therefore carries little weight when taken in 
isolation.
49   –   Talking about the United States, Cline (2016, p. 11) positively compares these 
disciplines to Philosophy departments.
50   –   For a full list, see http://hiw.kuleuven.be/ned/stafleden/index.html (accessed 
May 14, 2016).
51   –   There is also a sixth center, closely associated with the Faculty of Arts, but with 
no separate faculty: “LECTIO — Leuven Centre for the Study of the Transmission 
of Texts and Ideas in Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance” ( implicitly 
Western) (http://lectio.ghum.kuleuven.be/ [accessed May 14, 2016]).
52   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/cespf (accessed May 14, 2016). There is a project on 
multiculturalism.
53   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/claw/about /index.html (accessed May 14, 2016).
54   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/ned/onderzoek/cmfc.html and http://www.kuleuven.be/
onderzoek/onderzoeksdatabank/onderzoeksgroep/50000141.htm (in English) 
(accessed May 14, 2016).
55   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/dwmc/about (accessed May 14, 2016).
56   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/hua/about (accessed May 14, 2016).
57   –   https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/opleidingen/e/CQ_50311099.htm (ac-
cessed May 14, 2016).
58   –   http://hiw.kuleuven.be/ned/algemeen (accessed May 14, 2016).
59   –   In the last years, twenty-one students per year have chosen the course on 
 Chinese philosophy, and twenty-seven students have chosen the course on 
 East-West Perspectives in Philosophy. Due to the complexity of the organiza-
tion, the total number of students for one year is difficult to count (personal 
communication of the secretary of the Philosophy Institute, and email of July 5, 
2016).
60   –   https://onderwijsaanbod.kuleuven.be/opleidingen/e/CQ_50269035.htm (ac-
cessed May 14, 2016).
61   –   “Onderwerpen voor de masterproef 2015–2016. Lijst per centrum (alfabetisch).” 
Since the expertise of the faculty members is explicitly mentioned and is more 
stable than the suggested topics for 2015–2016, I have focused on their fields of 
expertise.
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62   –   The world philosophies are generally taught by members from outside the Insti-
tute, except for the course on “Russian philosophy” (taught by a philosophy 
professor who is proficient in Russian) and “Jewish philosophy” (on the basis 
of Western sources). The “East-West perspectives” is yearly taught by different 
faculty or invited guest-professors.
63   –   For pre-Han masters, I rather mean the thought attributed to Confucius, Mozi, 
etc.
64   –   Schwitzgebel (2015, p. 7) has calculated that in the United States the expertise 
of professional philosophers has the following ratio: Kant in relation to the 
whole Chinese tradition is 33 to 1, and medieval philosophy to Chinese thought 
is 19 to 1. See also Cleary 2016 and McLeod 2016, p. 12.
65   –   Livingstone 2003, pp. 1–3.
66   –   In China (or Japan or Korea) almost no History or Philosophy department would 
be restricted to China (or Japan or Korea) or to Asia. As Xinyan Jiang (2002, p. 3) 
points out, “There is hardly any philosophy department in China that does not 
teach Western philosophy and does not have faculty members specializing in 
Western philosophy.” For the diversity of History courses at, e.g., the University 
of Botswana, see http://www.thuto.org /ubh/ub/courses.htm (accessed July 8, 
2016).
67   –   This problem has been addressed by intellectuals who are not located at our 
universities. See, e.g., Luyendijk (2006) 2015; Koert Debeuf in Veto, December 
2016, pp. 14 –15; Ronny Mosuse in De Standaard, January 26, 2016.
68   –   Striking evidence of this attitude is a book co-authored by more than fifty 
KU Leuven professors for the sake of future generations of scholars. In their 
paragon of multidisciplinary research, the non-West is almost totally absent. 
See Achten et al. 2015. For critical reviews, see Defoort 2015a and Defoort 
2015b.
69   –   The Area Studies do not have independent commissions in the FWO. For 
the current (2015–2016) members of the commission, “Cult5: Filosofie en 
Ethiek,” see http://www.fwo.be/nl/het-fwo/organisatie/fwo-expertpanels/gebied- 
cultuurwetenschappen/cult5-filosofie-en-ethiek / (accessed May 15, 2016). Their 
expertise can be found on their own (or their universities’) websites. The same 
problem exists for search committees (also in the U.S.). See Benson 2008, p. 10; 
Bruya 2015b, p. 381; Park 2014; and Van Norden 2016a, p. 24.
70   –   The situation for each discipline is different. At least the existence of a “Chinese 
history” or “Chinese literature” is not questioned. For the characteristics of 
 Philosophy, see the section below on “Philosophy Being Philosophy.”
71   –   But in general, I share Erin Cline’s distrust toward non-specialists teaching 
 Chinese philosophy, having “picked up” some insights along the way. See Cline 
2016, pp. 10 –11.
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72   –   Fingarette 1972. As a scholar of (almost) exclusively Western philosophy of 
mind and psychology, Fingarette wrote a little book on Confucius that over-
turned the field. His lack of training in China matters was an asset as well as a 
disadvantage.
73   –   Leys had a degree in Law and in Art History, but wrote on a wide array of topics, 
including contemporary politics and literature. For his life and work, see Paquet 
2016.
74   –   There can also be a problem of “regional” students (e.g., from China) working 
under a supervisor without any “regional” expertise. See Erbaugh 2002, 
pp. 213–215, for a reflection on Chinese doctoral students coming to the West 
to apply Western/universal theories to Chinese material.
75   –   Although I believe it could be interestingly questioned, depending on what 
precisely one calls “history.” But that is another story altogether.
76   –   Bernasconi 1997, p. 214.
77   –   For the most recent situation in the United States, see Garfield and Van Norden 
2016; and Cleary 2016.
78   –   Garfield and Van Norden 2016. See also Wong 2008, p. 13; Cline 2016, p. 11; 
and Wong 2016, p. 9.
79   –   Bruya 2016, pp. 6 –8; Bruya 2017, pp. 991–1018 using the work of Robert 
 Axelrod and Ross Hammond. The “one move” setup of the prisoner’s dilemma 
showed that “ethnocentrism” (in-group favoritism) was more successful than 
pure altruism, pure egoism, and “treason” (cooperation with the out-group).
80   –   Bruya 2016, pp. 2–5; Bruya 2017, pp. 991–1018, using the work of Scott Page, 
Kath erine Phillips, Katie Liljenquist, and Margaret Neale.
81   –   See, e.g., Dotson 2012; Romano 2013; Cherry and Schwitzgebel 2016; and 
Ganeri 2016, p. 136.
82   –   Dabashi 2013.
83   –   Bernasconi (1997, p. 214) argues that the “specific problem” that triggered 
 European philosophy’s reinvention of itself as originally exclusively Greek was 
“the existence of something in China that looked sufficiently like what they 
 already knew as philosophy to lead some of them to believe that it was indeed 
philosophy.” On the historical context of the initial exclusion of the other in 
the establishment of philosophy, see Park 2013; for its continuation, see Wu 
1998.
84   –   Solomon 2001, p. 100.
85   –   Schwitzgebel 2015.
86   –   See Olberding 2017 on recent “boundary-policing” practices on social media.
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87   –   Bruya 2015b, pp. 379–380; Ganeri 2016, p. 135; and Weber 2017, p. 386, on 
the Revue Philosophique de Louvain and its ethnocentric content.
88   –   See http://www.fwo.be/nl/het-fwo/organisatie/logo-en-huisstijl/ (accessed May 
14, 2016).
89   –   On the suggestion to check the regions that were studied in the awarded 
 projects and the contribution of scholars acquainted with the relevant lan-
guages, the FWO expressed disinterest, explaining that it merely aimed at serv-
ing the university system as it happens to be (reflection meeting, FWO, on 
June 1, 2010).
90   –   This is how Olberding (2015, p. 15) summarizes the messages sent out to any 
type of non-Western thought. Or, as McLeod (2016, p. 14) puts it: “We will 
accept you as an (almost) equal partner, but only insofar as you come to resem-
ble us.”
91   –   Garfield and Van Norden 2016. See also Tiwald 2008, p. 6, on the futility of 
further argumentation.
92   –   Worries about the quality of current research in Chinese philosophy have 
been part of the legitimacy debates. See, e.g., Defoort and Ge 2005, p. 7, and 
Defoort and Standaert 1997b. Some reasons for these worries are the lack of 
originality, the infusion of nationalist concerns, the stringent use of jargon, the 
low status of philosophy in China (seen from, e.g., the low grades in the univer-
sity examination system), the failure to accept its own hybridity, etc.
93   –   McLeod 2016, p. 13.
94   –   Chow 1998, p. 4, and Ganeri 2016, p. 137.
95   –   Tiwald 2008, p. 7.
96   –   See Van Norden 2008, p. 5, and 2016a, p. 25. One controversial defender of 
logical reasoning in line with Averroes’ (twelfth century) reading of Aristotle 
was Siger of Brabant (thirteenth century), who was condemned by the inqui-
sition in 1277, but died an uncertain death. The present essay is written in 
 Leuven, the capital of the current province of Vlaams Brabant.
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